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In the United States, individual states pass a variety of rules and regulations in order
to create and enforce laws. My dissertation examines several key portions of this pro-
cess, by focusing on regulations impacting the auto insurance industry. I construct
three essays which examine strategies for passing such a regulation in state legisla-
tures, factors affecting which states implement the regulation and at what time, and
the effectiveness of the law itself. First, I evaluate the effect of state laws establishing
electronically accessible statewide databases of insured drivers on uninsured driving
and precaution. I find that the laws themselves do not cause a significant change in
the rate of uninsured motorists. However, there is a consistent, but not statistically
significant, decrease in the number of crashes and fatalities that occur after the law
is implemented. This indicates that any effect the law has in encouraging drivers to
obtain insurance is outweighed by those drivers who remain uninsured but drive more
carefully in order to avoid detection and the resulting penalties. Second, I examine
the market conditions associated with states’ implementation of these laws. I find
that states with lower rates of uninsured driving are more likely to implement an in-
surance database law. In addition, states with higher levels of market concentration
are less likely to implement the law. There is also some support for a diffusion theory
where states are more likely to implement laws their neighboring states have passed.
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Last, I evaluate the use of sunset provisions as a legislative bargaining tool that could
assist in gaining the majority needed to pass similar laws in additional states. I pre-
dict that, under conditions where it is preferable to limit a law’s durability rather
than changing the content of the law, sunset provisions will be used more frequently
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Chapter 1
Ensuring Compliance: The Effect
of Enhanced Auto Insurance
Enforcement on Uninsured Drivers
and Precaution
1.1 Introduction
Private passenger automobile insurance is legally required in order to operate a motor
vehicle in 49 states and the District of Columbia.1 While driving without automobile
insurance is illegal, the anticipated cost of being caught doing so is not high enough to
convince a nontrivial proportion of U.S. drivers (approximately 12.6 percent in 2012)
to acquire insurance or stop driving. On average across all states, the maximum fine
1While New Hampshire does not explicitly require liability insurance, the state does require
drivers to show proof of financial responsibility in order to operate a vehicle.
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for a first offense of driving without insurance is about $650, compared to average
insurance premiums of $786 per vehicle per year in 2012. However, fines only provide
a deterrent to the extent that they are enforceable. One reason for weak deterrence
is the inability of police to quickly and accurately verify proof of insurance during a
traffic stop or other interaction.2
Recent technology improvements have lowered the cost of enforcing auto insurance
requirements. Specifically, several states have passed laws funding the creation and
maintenance of statewide electronic databases of currently insured drivers.3 Police
are able to verify the insurance ID cards provided by drivers against the database,
improving the ability to accurately identify policies that are in force.4 The ease of
access to insurance status information reduces the cost of enforcement, and therefore
increases the likelihood of being caught driving while uninsured. Thus, when police
gain the ability to quickly and accurately verify a driver’s insurance status, the pro-
portion of uninsured drivers may decrease. While proponents of these laws point to
a strong correlation between the law’s implementation and fewer uninsured drivers, I
find that after controlling for other relevant variables there is no significant decrease
in the proportion of uninsured drivers, as compared to states that did not implement
such a law.
2Typically, proof of insurance may be provided by a printed or electronic version of an ID card
produced by the insurance company. An insurance policy may be canceled before the end of the
policy term, with a prorated premium returned to the driver for any unused days, but the ID card is
not revoked. As the Kansas Legislative Research Department (2015) report confirms: “States’ motor
vehicle departments have reported increasing problems with fraudulent cards and with motorists
paying for insurance and then canceling that insurance but keeping the card.”
3III (2014) defines these databases as “...Insurer verification laws mandating that all insurance
companies in a state submit the entire list of their policyholders to an outside vendor or a state
agency, which match them to motor vehicle registrations...”
4I investigate the effectiveness of two levels of stringency used in introducing such a database. I
examine the nine states that established an electronic link for police to access a driver’s insurance
status in real time, directly from the insurer. I also consider the 13 total states that require insurers
to periodically provide their entire book of business to update a database for police to access, without
creating a direct link between police and insurers.
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In addition to affecting drivers’ decisions of whether to acquire insurance, the in-
creased ability of police to accurately identify uninsured drivers could have an effect
on the level of precaution used on the nation’s roadways, which I estimate using two
measures: total reported crashes and fatal crashes. The predicted effect on driver
precaution is ambiguous, due to competing effects. Some drivers may be incentivized
to obtain insurance as a result of the law change, in response to the increased chance
of detection. These drivers experience moral hazard, which causes them to use less
precaution now that they are insured. The law may also have an impact on drivers
who remain uninsured, as the increased probability of detection encourages them to
drive more cautiously in response to the higher expected costs of being pulled over.
Drivers who break the law by driving uninsured may use extra precaution while driv-
ing to attempt to avoid detection. I estimate that the implementation of these laws
results in a negative but statistically insignificant effect on both total reported crashes
and fatal crashes per million licensed drivers per year. This suggests that the pre-
dominate effect of the law is incentivizing uninsured drivers to drive more carefully,
creating relatively safer roadways without a significant change in the proportion of
uninsured drivers.
My research seeks to make two main contributions to the literature on regulation,
insurance, and optimal deterrence. First, I examine the effect on uninsured driving
of reducing the cost of enforcement of uninsured motorist laws. Second, I have con-
structed a novel dataset of state-level reported crashes by year to analyze whether
these changes result in roads that are safer or more dangerous, specifically by exam-
ining changes both in the rate of fatalities and in the rate of total crashes.5
5While fatal crashes are unlikely to occur without being reported, the sporadic nature and limited
number of crashes involving a fatality make it difficult to identify root causes of differences over time.
While total reported crashes are more common and less volatile, the likelihood of unreported crashes
is also higher. Thus, I consider both measures.
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I find that electronic database laws are not successful in accomplishing their intended
result of decreasing the proportion of uninsured drivers on the road, but that they
cause a small (but statistically insignificant) decrease in the total number of crashes
per licensed driver on U.S. roadways.
1.2 Background
An economic reason for government to require automobile insurance is to adjust for
the inability of injured parties to collect full damages from those who cause them
harm. When a driver causes an accident, it is possible that he could cause dam-
ages well in excess of his ability to pay. Due to this constraint, most states require
mandatory automobile liability insurance that meets certain minimum limits in order
to better assure drivers that they will be indemnified in the event of an accident.
However, liability coverage is limited to the coverage levels purchased by the insured
driver who caused the accident.6 Thus, because a driver cannot pay more than the
sum of his total assets and liability coverage in the event of an accident, the market
failure lies in the fact that a negligent driver is subject to limited liability.7
There is some debate in the literature over how dangerously uninsured motorists
drive.8 However, it is possible to predict the relative level of precaution used by an
individual driver when he does or does not have insurance. A driver who is uninsured
6A general overview of the insurance market is presented in the Appendix.
7See Keeton and Kwerel (1984) for further discussion.
8Because uninsured drivers seek to avoid detection, they are often only identified when committing
a traffic violation or as part of an automobile accident. Khazzoom (2000) provides additional
discussion of knowns and unknowns considering uninsured motorists, Query and Berryman (2010)
offer a targeted discussion of uninsured motorists in New Mexico, and Butler (2004) argues that
uninsured drivers may not be more dangerous than insured drivers, as the population of only accident
involved uninsured drivers is compared to the entire population of insured drivers, and does not take
into account differences in the number of miles driven.
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is predicted to drive more cautiously, in order to avoid fines and responsibility for any
damages caused in an accident. Drivers who obtain insurance face a moral hazard
problem, in which they drive less carefully than they would if they remained unin-
sured, knowing that they are subject to fewer costs for damage they may cause.
If uninsured motorists are driving more carefully in order to avoid detection, then
a law with an intended effect of reducing the uninsured motorist rate could also
create an unintended consequence of incentivizing people to drive less carefully. This
concept builds upon the idea of the Peltzman Effect, pioneered by Peltzman (1975),
who showed that regulations requiring seat belts led to an increase in pedestrian
deaths and non-fatal crashes. Conversely, it is possible that this effect is outweighed
by the extra precaution employed by uninsured motorists, in order to continue to
evade detection and penalties.
Previous research has explored the factors that contribute to uninsured driving, as
well as precaution and roadway fatalities. Ma and Schmit (2000) analyzed the role
of various factors on the likelihood of purchasing auto insurance, finding that stricter
enforcement (such as requiring compulsory insurance) and larger fines were associated
with lower proportions of uninsured drivers.9 I expand the analysis to consider the
impact of insured driver databases, as well as studying the effect on fatal and total
accidents.
Cohen and Dehejia (2004) use an instrumental variables approach on a panel of 50
states from 1970-98. The authors employ the introduction of compulsory insurance
and no-fault laws as an instrument for the rate of uninsured drivers, finding that an
9Additional research has explored other factors that may contribute to the proportion of unin-
sured motorists. For instance, Query and Berryman (2010) show that, all else equal, an increase in
illegal immigration increases the percentage of uninsured motorists in a state. Cole et al. (2001) find
that higher levels of fines are associated with more compliance with uninsured motorist laws, but
do not find evidence that other penalties, such as longer jail sentences, increase rates of compliance.
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increase in traffic fatalities was produced by a reduction in the incidence of uninsured
motorists. The increase in fatalities is contributed to the moral hazard associated
with obtaining insurance coverage. I explore similar, but distinct, questions. First,
because I examine a market where many states have required mandatory insurance
for decades, I can look specifically at the effect of lowering the cost of enforcement of
an existing law. Second, Cohen and Dehejia note that “...those drivers who remain
uninsured are induced to drive more carefully...If, however, compulsory insurance laws
were ineffective, there would be no effect on insured drivers” (Cohen and Dehejia,
2004, p. 365). I focus on this prevailing effect of uninsured drivers adjusting their
level of precaution, rather than obtaining insurance.10 Additionally, as the effect on
fatalities is determined by competing forces (drivers obtaining insurance using less
precaution; drivers remaining uninsured using more precaution), I test which of these
effects outweighs the other when impacting the subset of drivers who were breaking
the law by driving without insurance.
1.2.1 Verifying Insurance Coverage
For police officers, the task of verifying insurance coverage has not always been as
straightforward as it may seem. When a driver purchases an insurance policy, the
insurer provides the driver with an ID card, which lists information on coverages
purchased, as well as an end date for the policy period. A typical policy is written to
provide six months of coverage before the policy must be renewed.
10Cole and McCullough (2007) propose the solution of improved tracking techniques and en-
forcement to reduce the number of uninsured drivers. They acknowledge the costs and problems
associated with creating and maintaining a database of insured drivers, but also mention the suc-
cess in reducing the uninsured motorist rate in states that had begun implementing such programs.
However, the authors make no attempt to further investigate these claims to determine whether the
regulation is the causal factor driving the decrease.
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If a driver is stopped by a police officer for a primary offense (reckless driving, for
instance), the officer can then request that the driver show proof of insurance on the
vehicle.11 However, if a driver cancels the insurance policy, he is not forced to return
the ID card. For police officers, there was not previously a low cost way of verifying
that the information on the card was correct.
In response to this issue, states have begun implementing two types of laws to improve
the ability of police to determine the validity of an insurance policy. Beginning in
1995, Utah was the first state to implement a “Book of Business” (BOB) law, which
requires all insurers in a state to upload their entire book of business to a police
accessible statewide database of insured drivers on a periodic basis.12 As of 2014, a
total of 13 states had laws requiring BOB reporting. Several years later, technology
progressed to make possible another way for police to verify an insurance policy,
through an immediate direct electronic connection to the insurance companies writing
policies in the state. These “Online Verification” (OLV) laws provide additional
assurance that the insurance policy is currently in effect at the time of the officer’s
inquiry. Table 1.1 provides the states and year of implementation for each type of
law. For my analysis I consider OLV and BOB laws together, due to the limited
number of states that implemented such laws during my sample period.
1.3 Model
I consider a model of the optimal level of uninsured driving following the implications
of the model of an optimal level of crime put forth by Becker (1974). Even with
11Driving without insurance is considered a secondary offense in all states, and therefore a driver
cannot be stopped solely on the suspicion of driving without insurance.
12See Figures 1.4 & 1.5 for diagrams of these procedures.
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compulsory insurance laws in place, some drivers continue to choose to drive without
insurance. The relative costs and benefits of choosing to drive without insurance are
influenced by a combination of the expected penalty assessed when caught, and the
probability of being caught. People respond to changes in the penalty or likelihood
of being caught, and for some, this leads to a decision to switch from driving without
insurance, to becoming insured.
As Becker argued, “[if] muggers are rational, we do not have to make mugging impos-
sible in order to prevent it, merely unprofitable.” The same may be said to a certain
extent for driving without insurance. However, raising the fine for driving uninsured
is only one way to decrease the “unprofitability.” In this context, driving uninsured
is also less profitable when being caught is more probable.13 It is with this in mind
that states have attempted to increase the likelihood of drivers being caught.
A driver decides whether to drive with or without insurance by considering whether
the costs associated with driving without insurance outweigh the costs of being insured
as represented in Equation 1.1.
Cost of Driving Uninsured︷ ︸︸ ︷
(ρ)Fine+ (αun)Damages R
Cost of Driving Insured︷ ︸︸ ︷
Premiums+ (αin)Deductible (1.1)
where ρ is the probability that a the driver is caught violating the compulsory insur-
ance law, αun is the probability of an accident if the driver is uninsured, and αin is
the probability of an accident if the driver has insurance.
13See Polinsky and Shavell (1999) for an in depth overview of the theory and relevant literature on
the public enforcement of law. Also, papers including Mookherjee (1997) and Levitt (2007), which
discuss when and how enforcement methods may be most effective under various conditions.
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The left-hand side of this equation can be thought of as a combination of several
possible outcomes from driving without insurance.14 Each driver weighs his relative
likelihood of experiencing these costs. For the marginal uninsured driver, the left-
hand side of Equation 1.1 is less than or equal to the right-hand side.15 I treat the
implementation of an auto insurance database law as an exogenous shock, which
increases ρ, and alters this balance for some drivers. The affected drivers would be
expected to purchase an insurance policy in response to this change.
Put simply, I consider how a policy which increases the expected cost of driving unin-
sured (by lowering the cost of enforcement) affects this choice. Cohen and Dehejia
(2004) consider a similar question, examining the initial implementation of compul-
sory auto insurance laws. They find that that compulsory insurance laws reduced
the proportion of uninsured drivers. However, compulsory insurance laws introduced
both ρ and Fine simultaneously, and therefore a distinction could not be made be-
tween drivers’ responses to increased fines, and drivers’ responses to increased en-
forcement.
1.3.1 Effect of Policy on Obtaining Insurance
Consider a policy which makes it easier (less costly) to identify uninsured motorists.
This policy does not directly affect the costs of driving with insurance, but does affect
the costs of driving without insurance. In particular, the policy decreases the cost of
enforcement, which increases ρ, and therefore increases the expected cost of driving
uninsured. As the Becker model suggests, increased enforcement should lead to more
14See Equation A.2 in the appendix for a representation of possible outcomes.
15For simplicity, the costs associated with each of the descriptions listed is assumed to include
both the direct monetary cost, and any additional costs imposed such as administrative and court
costs.
9
compliance with the law, and thus less uninsured driving.
Hypothesis 1: An increase in the expected cost of driving without automobile
insurance will result in a decrease in the proportion of drivers who are uninsured.
1.3.2 Effect of Policy on Fatalities
Increased enforcement of uninsured motorists laws may have an effect on the level of
precaution used while driving. Most notable is the optimal response of drivers who
are uninsured before the increased enforcement is put into place.
1.3.2.1 Uninsured Status Before and After Policy
Implementing a law enhancing enforcement of uninsured driving will likely impact the
distribution of insured and uninsured drivers. As can be seen in Table 1.2, individuals
may change their behavior and fall into a different category as a result of the policy.
Potential drivers are represented as either Uninsured (U), Insured (I), or Not Driving
(N) before (0) and after (1) the policy change.
• Group (U0, I1) is the main group targeted by the policy considered in this paper.
Drivers in this group were uninsured before the policy change, but have now
acquired insurance in response to an increase in the expected cost of driving
without insurance. This group is subject to moral hazard, as insurance compa-
nies cannot perfectly monitor their actions. These drivers are predicted to use
less precaution, as they now have coverage in the case of an accident and will
not be fined for lack of insurance if pulled over.
• Groups (U0, U1), (I0, I1), and (N0, N1), contain individuals who do not modify
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their driving status or insured status. However, the drivers who are uninsured
both before and after the policy change are expected to drive more cautiously
now that the probability of being caught has increased.
• Group (U0, N1) may also respond directly to the policy. Rather than continuing
to drive with no insurance, these drivers stop driving all together.
• Groups (I0, U1), (I0, N1), (N0, U1), and (N0, I1) contain individuals who are
unlikely to change their insurance status directly as a result of the policy. An
insured driver is not predicted to cancel his insurance coverage or stop driving,
and a non-driver would not begin driving with or without insurance in response
to an increase in the probability of being caught driving uninsured.
Hypothesis 2: The implementation of a law that lowers the cost of enforcement
of uninsured motorist prohibitions will have an ambiguous effect on precaution, de-
pending on the relative impact of the moral hazard and selection effects. If the
prevailing effect from increased enforcement of uninsured driving is drivers obtaining
insurance, then crashes may increase due to moral hazard effects. If the prevailing
effect from raising the cost of uninsured driving is drivers remaining uninsured, then
crash frequencies are expected to decrease as these individuals drive more safely to
avoid detection.
Thus, whether insurance database laws will increase or decrease crashes and fatalities
is an empirical question. The more effective the law is in decreasing the proportion
of uninsured drivers, the more an increase in crashes is expected. Conversely, when
uninsured drivers remain uninsured, their increased level of precaution used to avoid
detection is expected to result in fewer crashes.
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1.3.3 Measurement
It is impossible to observe the number of uninsured drivers directly, so the proportion
of uninsured drivers on the road must be estimated.16 I utilize a measure which
estimates the percentage of uninsured motorists in a state as the fraction of reported






The limitations of this measure should be noted. First, this measure fails to capture
accidents that were not reported to the police or insurance companies, which may
be the case if anyone involved in an accident seeks to pay damages directly to those
harmed rather than risk additional penalties for driving uninsured. Additionally,
this measure may include accidents involving drivers registered in other states, who
would not be directly affected by the database regulation.17 Finally, this measure
assumes that uninsured motorists are involved in accidents with the same frequency
as insured drivers. If uninsured drivers are, on average, more accident prone than the
average insured driver in a state, Equation 1.2 would overstate the true percentage
of uninsured motorists, while the estimate would understate the true percentage if
uninsured drivers are on average less accident-prone.18
16See Khazzoom (2000) for additional discussion of the benefits and drawbacks of other methods of
estimating the rate of uninsured motorists through randomly sampling registered vehicles, matching
databases, or surveying samples of households on their insurance status.
17Drivers’ insurance requirements are based on their home state. While this insurance follows the
driver across state lines, the database policy studied in this paper is state specific, and therefore
doesn’t provide a new mechanism for immediately identifying the insurance status of out-of-state
drivers.
18Alternatively, one could estimate the proportion of uninsured drivers by comparing the number
of vehicle registrations in a state to the number of insured vehicles. While most states require
insurance in order to register a vehicle, many people will drop or fail to renew their insurance
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1.4 Data
I construct a data set consisting of a balanced panel spanning 14 years (2001-2014)
of state and year level observations. Data from the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (2017) (NAIC) were used to construct estimates of the rate of unin-
sured motorists in each state, following Equation 1.2. The NAIC reports also provided
data on average insurance premiums. These were combined with data from the Prop-
erty Casualty Insurers Association of America (PCI) and Verisk Solutions (2015) on
law implementation dates, from individual state Annual State Crash Facts reports
on total reported crashes, from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) on
roadway fatalities, data on the number of licensed drivers from the Federal Highway
Administration, the National Center for Statistics and Analysis (2017) on the num-
ber of miles driven for motorists each year, and the US Census for other demographic
data.
1.4.1 Summary Statistics
The data for this paper include 49 states and the District of Columbia over a 14 year
period, 2001 - 2014.19 During this time, a total of 13 states implemented at least
one of the Book of Business or Online Verification laws, in addition to three states
which had BOB laws in place before 2001, with a total of nine states implementing
the stricter OLV type of law, providing police with immediate electronic verification
of insurance. Table 1.1 describes the implementation across states over time.
while the vehicle remains registered. The result is the potential for a difference in the number of
registrations and the number of insured vehicles in a state. Unfortunately, an accurate count of
insured vehicles is not available for the vast majority of states and years in my sample period, thus
this measure cannot be employed.
19The data set excludes Texas, as data on bodily injury and uninsured motorist claims frequency
were not available.
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Summary statistics for variables of interest are presented in Table 1.3. An estimated
average of 16.14% of drivers were uninsured across the 14 years in my sample data
set. The average six-month insurance premium was $775, while the average minimum
fine for a first offense of driving uninsured was $653. States experienced an average
of 33,285 total crashes per million licensed drivers during this time period, with an
average of 202.5 of those crashes involving a fatality. In my sample time frame, an
average of 72.7% of residents lived in an urban area of their state, and approximately
12.8% lived below the poverty line.
1.5 Empirical Methodology
1.5.1 Estimating Effect of Policy on Uninsured
I estimate the effect of a state implementing a law which allows for enhanced en-
forcement of uninsured motorist prohibitions. I include state and year fixed effects
to control for state specific unobservables and trends in the proportion of uninsured
motorists over time, as well as a vector of exogenous covariates.20
I estimate the following,
ProportionUninsuredMotoristsit = β0 + β1EnforcementLawit + β2Finei+
Xβ3 + τt + σi + it
(1.3)
Where,
20I also estimate this regression no fixed effects and with no controls.
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• ProportionUninsuredMotoristsit represents the estimated percentage of mo-
torists who do not have state minimum levels of insurance in state i in year
t,
• EnforcementLawit is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the enhanced
enforcement law is in effect in state i in year t and 0 otherwise,21
• Finei is the maximum listed penalty, in thousands of dollars, for a first offense
conviction for driving uninsured in state i,
• τt represents year level time fixed effects, and
• σi represents state fixed effects.
The vector of other covariates, X, includes:
• AveragePremiumit represents the average cost paid to purchase one year of
insurance coverage in state i in year t,
• NoPlayit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a state has “No Pay, No Play” laws,
which limit an uninsured driver’s ability to collect damages from an insured
driver, when the insured driver was at fault in an accident,22
• NoFaultit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a state has “No Fault” laws, and
0 otherwise,
• Urbanit represents the proportion of residents in each state living in areas clas-
sified as urban, and
21I separately estimate the EnforcementLaw variable considering if a state has introduced either
law (OLV or BOB), OLV, or BOB individually.
22No pay, no play laws are currently in effect in 10 states (Alaska, California, Iowa, Kansas,
Louisiana, Michigan, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Oregon). These laws “limit an
uninsured drivers ability to claim damages if he or she is in an accident with an insured motorist.
The Insurance Research Council (IRC) found that ’no play’ laws had a modest effect on uninsured
rates, reducing them an average of 1.6 percent.”Wiltz (2015)
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• Povertyit represents the proportion of residents in each state below the poverty
line.
1.5.2 Estimating Effect of Uninsured on Precaution
I utilize a reduced form analysis to estimate the effect of laws that provide for en-
hanced enforcement of uninsured motorist prohibitions on total crashes, as well as on
fatal crashes. Once again, I include state and year fixed effects, as well as a vector of
exogenous covariates. I estimate,
CrashesPerDriverit = γ0 + γ1EnforcementLawit + γ2Finei + Xγ3 + σt + i (1.4)
Where,
• CrashesPerDriverit represents the number of total reported crashes per million
licensed drivers in state i in year t, in my first specification, and the number of
fatal crashes per million licensed drivers in my second specification.23
The literature has traditionally focused only on fatal crashes, as the data are more
readily accessible at the state-year level. In this context, using fatalities as a measure
of driver precaution has the benefit of not likely being under-reported. A driver who
is uninsured that causes a minor accident may want to avoid police involvement,
23Crashes are measured per million licensed drivers in order to adjust for any changes in the
number of crashes resulting from having more or few drivers on the road. However, this does not
directly account for other adjustments that may be made by these drivers. Specifically, one could
also measure crashes per miles driven, in order to account for changes along the margin of how much
driving is limited or increased, rather than how many drivers are on the roadways. Either measure
is an attempt to estimate changes in the amount of precaution used by drivers before and after a
change.
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whereas an accident involving a fatality is likely to generate a police report.
However, fatal accidents occur relatively infrequently, making it difficult to predict
changes with a high level of certainty. For this reason, I have compiled a data set of the
total number of crashes in each state for the years in my sample period. Observing
all crashes, rather than only fatal crashes, provides several benefits. First, there
is a much larger number of total crashes per year, and the measurement is much
less sporadic. Second, I seek to measure the degree to which uninsured drivers are
adapting to avoid police protection when a law is passed. It is much more likely
that the additional precaution used is put forth to avoid less severe accidents, as the
reckless driving that generates fatal crashes is more likely to garner the attention of
law enforcement.
With either measure, a negative sign on the coefficient on EnforcementLawit would
indicate that the dominating effect is drivers using more precaution after the law is
passed.
1.6 Results
1.6.1 Effect of Policy on Uninsured Motorist Rate
I find that an increase in the expected cost of driving without automobile insur-
ance does not result in a statistically significant decrease in the proportion of drivers
who are uninsured. Specifically, Table 1.4 column 3 shows that controlling for state
and year fixed effects produces an estimate of the proportion of motorists who are
uninsured in a state when the policy change is implemented that is not significantly
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different from 0.24 There are two possible reasons for this to occur. The law itself
may not be impactful enough to alter drivers’ behaviors, or drivers may be adjusting
along another margin, rather than by obtaining insurance.
Table 1.4 also displays the expected sign on the control variables of interest. Higher
average premiums, the presence of “No Fault” laws, and higher levels of poverty are
all associated with more uninsured drivers, while higher fines are associated with
fewer uninsured drivers.
1.6.2 Effect of Policy on Precaution
While the laws considered in this paper are not necessarily effective in lowering the
percentage of uninsured drivers, my results indicate that the laws may have an effect
on driver safety.
A decrease in total and fatal crashes as a result of the law’s implementation indicates
that the law is effective in making streets slightly safer, as uninsured drivers use
more precaution in order to avoid detection. As a result, roadways do not have fewer
uninsured drivers, but the roads are safer. While Cohen and Dehejia (2004) observed
an increase in fatalities when more drivers obtained insurance, I find that in my
sample it is the drivers who remain uninsured who have the larger effect.
Thus, while these programs do not appear to be successful in their stated purpose of
reducing the number of uninsured drivers in a state, the $1.05 to $7 million in start-up
costs needed to initiate such a program 25 may still be generating a positive effect.
States must consider any additional benefit associated with less dangerous roadways
24Figure 1.8.2 demonstrates the overall decrease in uninsured motorist rates during this time
period for states that did not have a database regulation in place.
25Estimated by Carlson et al. (2015).
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and fewer fatalities as a result of these laws.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper evaluates the effect of state laws establishing electronically accessible
statewide databases of insured drivers on uninsured driving and precaution. Lowering
the enforcement cost of identifying and penalizing uninsured drivers will raise the
expected cost to drivers of operating a vehicle while uninsured. I find that states
implementing such a policy are not successful in reducing the proportion of uninsured
drivers on their roadways, but that the drivers who remain uninsured may use more
precaution in order to avoid the enhanced enforcement. My results show that a
Becker-type model of an optimal level of uninsured drivers can be applied, and that
drivers respond to changes not only in the severity of a penalty for non-compliance,
but in the likelihood of receiving such a penalty. In this case, drivers who respond to
increased enforcement by purchasing insurance have weaker incentives to drive with
precaution as compared to those who remain uninsured. Thus, the more successful
a policy is in convincing additional drivers to obtain insurance, the more dangerous
roadways could become.
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1.8 Tables and Figures
1.8.1 Tables
Table 1.1: Online Verification and Book of Business Implementation Dates
Implementation Online Book of














MT 2012 X X
AL 2013 X X
UTc 2013 X
WV 2013 X X
CT 2015 X X
RI 2015 X
LA 2016 X X
MS 2017 X
TN 2017 X
Note: My sample contains data for 2001 - 2014. The three states
in dark gray had laws in place spanning the entire sample period,
while the five states in light gray did not implement OLV or BOB
laws until after the sample period.
a South Carolina and California allow for voluntary participation
of insurers in the Online Verification program.
b Texas is excluded from all analysis, as the data necessary to cal-
culate the proportion of uninsured motorists are not available.
c Utah’s 2013 law introduced Online Verification requirements
which updated the ’Insure-Rite’ Book of Business program that
had made Utah a pioneer in auto insurance enforcement programs
in 1995.
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Table 1.2: Insurance Status - Before and After Increased Enforcement
Possible Insured/Uninsured Status
for Potential Drivers






Insured (I0,I1) (I0,U1) (I0,N1)
Uninsured (U0,I1) (U0,U1) (U0,N1)
Not Driving N/A (N0,I1) (N0,U1) (N0,N1)
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Table 1.3: Summary Statistics
Descriptive Statistics
Mean Min Max Source
(Std Dev)
Uninsured Motorist Rate 16.14 2.54 35.86 NAIC Database Reports
(5.95)
Regulation 0.15 0 1 PCI; Verisk
(0.36)
Online Verification 0.07 0 1 PCI; Verisk
(0.26)
Book Of Business 0.14 0 1 PCI; Verisk
(0.34)
Fatalities 694.28 15 4333 FARS
(675.55)
Total Reported Crashes 126097.71 3258 544742 Annual State Crash Facts
(112890.64)
Total Crash Per Mil. Driver 33285.32 6321.94 59143.54 Annual State Crash Facts
(9715.26)
Fatal Crash Per Mil. Driver 202.50 37.41 580.17 Annual State Crash Facts
(84.42)
Injury Crash Per Mil Driver 9727.58 3211.42 18231.84 Annual State Crash Facts
(2573.54)
Fine 653.50 0.00 5000.00 CFA Report
(in $s) (794.14)
Average Premium 775.53 498.00 1263.67 NAIC Database Reports
(in $s) (172.42)
No Pay, No Play 0.20 0 1 IRC
(0.40)
No Fault 0.24 0 1 IRC
(0.43)
Urban 72.71 38.20 100 Census, CPS Data
(15.10)
Poverty 12.81 5.40 25.75 Census, CPS Data
(3.49)
N 700
Note: Summary statistics cover yearly observations for 50 states from 2001-2014. Uninsured Motorist Rate is
the estimated number of drivers with no insurance per 100 drivers. Regulation, Online Verification, and Book
of Business are equal to 1 when a state has such a law in place, and 0 otherwise. Fatalities and Total Crashes
are annual measurements at the state level. Fine is measured as the maximum fine for a first offense of driving
without insurance. Average Premium is measured as the average amount paid for a policyholder to purchase
one year of insurance coverage in the state. No Pay, No Play and No Fault are indicators equal to 1 when a
state has the respective law in place. Urban measures the proportion of a state’s population living in an urban
area, and Poverty represents the proportion of a state’s population living below the poverty line.
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Table 1.4: Effect of Uninsured Driving Enforcement Laws on Uninsured Motorist
Rate
No Controls No FE Region FE State FE Year FE Region & Year FE State & Year FE
Regulation -2.099∗ -1.679 -2.223 -0.580 -0.210 -1.815 -0.153
(1.177) (1.039) (1.295) (0.861) (0.791) (1.255) (0.829)
Fine -0.000709 -0.00124∗ (.) -0.000717 -0.00125∗ (.)
(0.000623) (0.000476) (0.000980) (0.000526)
Average Premium 0.00886∗ 0.0156∗∗ -0.00466 0.00803 0.0169∗∗ 0.00729
(0.00524) (0.00313) (0.00419) (0.00610) (0.00320) (0.00686)
No Pay, No Play -0.0812 -0.875 1.155 -0.129 -0.989 1.009
(1.550) (1.768) (0.755) (1.190) (1.802) (0.891)
No Fault 1.412 2.679 8.916 6.081 2.614 8.484∗
(2.048) (1.342) (5.113) (3.861) (1.381) (4.828)
Urban 0.00474 -0.0596 -0.113 -0.00338 -0.0656 0.101
(0.0619) (0.0508) (0.155) (0.0979) (0.0488) (0.257)
Poverty 0.297 0.0374 -0.212∗ -0.0489 0.120 -0.0794
(0.180) (0.200) (0.0845) (0.0780) (0.247) (0.0818)
Constant 16.45∗∗∗ 5.506 8.555 21.14∗∗∗ 11.11∗ 9.032 3.098
(0.894) (3.998) (4.433) (10.46) (5.990) (4.591) (16.97)
Observations 700 700 700 700 700 700 700
R2 0.016 0.135 0.176 0.129 0.171 0.195 0.177
Region FE X X
State FE X X
Year FE X X X
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable Proportion of Uninsured Motorists. 50 states, 2001-2014.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.5: Effect of Uninsured Driving Enforcement Laws on Crashes
Dependent Variable:
Total Crashes Fatal Crashes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Regulation -789.1 -472.1 -462.2 15.59∗∗ -9.310 -13.43
(2,188) (946.8) (991.8) (4.038) (10.72) (11.79)
Fine 0.191 -0.0930 (-) -0.00116 -0.000125 (-)
(0.438) (1.169) 0.00909 (0.00647)
Average Premium 18.41∗∗ 12.11∗ 12.96∗ -0.00217 0.0338 0.0510
(4.842) (6.634) (7.695) (0.0366) (0.0371) (0.0450)
No Pay, No Play -83.13 335.2 741.8 -6.933 -4.118 -3.545
(5,932) (1,986) (962.7) (25.63) (14.53) (5.824)
No Fault -2,164 1,139 2,387∗∗∗ 16.83 2.899 18.77∗
(3,682) (1,361) (851.2) (8.474) (13.11) (10.91)
Urban -81.62 15.47 378.6 -2.957∗ -3.012∗∗∗ -2.654
(69.17) (120.5) (313.4) (1.124) (0.802) (3.032)
Poverty 125.9 -226.7∗∗ -293.9∗∗ 1.568 -1.422∗ -2.483∗∗
(565.4) (110.7) (118.0) (1.143) (0.863) (0.933)
Constant 23,967∗∗ 30,233∗∗∗ 4,048 394.8∗ 448.2∗∗∗ 418.3∗
(6,244) (6,964) (22,708) (74.59) (59.41) (221.0)
N 630 630 630 700 700 700
Region FE X X
State FE X X
Year FE X X X X
Robust Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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1.8.2 Figures
Figure 1.1: States Enacting Either Uninsured Driving Enforcement Law
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Figure 1.2: States Enacting Laws for Immediate Online Verification of Auto Insurance
Policies
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Figure 1.3: States Enacting Laws Requiring Insurers to Periodically Submit Entire
Book of Business
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Figure 1.4: Procedure for Insurance Verification: Before Law
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Figure 1.5: Procedure for Insurance Verification: After Law
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Figure 1.6: Average Uninsured Motorist Rates - By Year - States with no Database
Regulation
30
Figure 1.7: Insurance Verification Laws and Uninsured Motorist Rates (1/3)
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Figure 1.8: Insurance Verification Laws and Uninsured Motorist Rates (2/3)
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Figure 1.9: Insurance Verification Laws and Uninsured Motorist Rates (3/3)
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Figure 1.10: Insurance Verification Laws and Total Reported Crash Rates (1/3)
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Figure 1.11: Insurance Verification Laws and Total Reported Crash Rates (2/3)
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Figure 1.12: Insurance Verification Laws and Total Reported Crash Rates (3/3)
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Chapter 2
An Investigation of the Factors
Associated with States’
Implementation of Enhanced Auto
Insurance Enforcement Laws
2.1 Introduction
The optimal level of enforcement for existing laws may vary from state to state, based
on the relative cost and benefit of increasing or decreasing enforcement and compli-
ance. A state’s decision of how, and how much, to enforce its laws requiring drivers
to maintain automobile liability insurance could be based on a variety of factors. In
the years spanning 2004 to 2014, 13 states implemented new laws intended to reduce
uninsured driving by making it easier for police to identify whether drivers were in-
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sured.1 This is accomplished by requiring insurers to provide up-to-date information
on the which drivers have active policies. What caused 13 states to implement such
a law? I explore whether three main factors have a significant impact on a state’s
decision to implement the law; the rate of uninsured driving, market concentration,
and neighboring states’ implementation of the law.
While it would at first seem that states with high rates of uninsured driving would
have the most to gain from an enhanced auto insurance enforcement law, as they have
the most room for improvement, there also exists the possibility that states with low
rates of uninsured driving place a higher value on restricting the number of uninsured
drivers on the road. Therefore, I first examine and compare the uninsured motorist
rate across states that did and did not implement such a law.
Legislators who consider a database law may be influenced not only by their con-
stituents, but by interest groups from the affected industry as well. In order to
comply with the law, insurers must endure the fixed and variable costs associated
with developing and maintaining the systems necessary to relay information on their
book-of-business to the state. However, insurers could also expect to benefit from
the law’s effectiveness, as they have the opportunity to sell additional policies if more
drivers become insured. This effect may not be felt evenly among insurers of dif-
ferent size. Thus, I investigate whether market concentration among auto insurance
companies in each state can predict the law’s implementation.
The structure of state governments in the United States provides state legislators
with the ability to observe how regulations perform in other states, before enacting
the law themselves. Regional diffusion theory argues that states’ decisions on which
1Note that Ernest (2018) finds no evidence that these laws are effective in reducing the rate of
uninsured driving in a given state, but that they may create incentives for safer driving and fewer
crashes.
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legislation to enact are influenced by laws that have been enacted in neighboring
states. I investigate whether this phenomenon is applicable to the passage of auto
insurance database regulation laws.
After investigation of each of these factors, I find that an insurance database law
is more likely to be implemented in a state with a relatively low rate of uninsured
driving. This suggests that states with a strong interest in keeping uninsured driving
to a minimum implement the law to satisfy this preference, rather than in an attempt
to lower extremely high rates of uninsured driving. In addition, the market concen-
tration of insurers in the state plays a role, with the law having a greater chance
of implementation in states with higher levels of competition. Finally, I find some
evidence for diffusion theory in explaining states’ decisions to implement database
laws when neighboring states have done so.
2.2 Background - Theory
The federal system of government in the United States creates a structure of shared
power between the federal and state governments. This structure allows for the pos-
sibility of individual states to pass laws in a sort of testing-ground for the law’s
effectiveness, with many studies having been conducted on the diffusion of such in-
novations.2 If the regulation performs well, the law could then be implemented on a
larger scale, or even at the national level. For the automobile insurance market, how-
ever, the responsibility for implementing and enforcing laws and regulations remains
with the individual states.3
2See Walker (1969) for discussion of diffusion theory and states’ incentives to adopt policies that
were enacted in neighboring states.
3The McCarran-Ferguson Act (1945) exempted the insurance industry from most federal regula-
tion. Thus, states enact laws and requirements individually at the state level.
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While 49 states and the District of Columbia require that private passenger automo-
biles meet minimum liability limits for insurance in order to legally operate a vehicle
on the state’s roadways, a proportion of the drivers in each state break this law and
drive without insurance. Estimates of the fraction of drivers in each state who do not
have the minimum level of liability coverage range from less than 5% to more than
30%, depending on the state and year. These drivers are referred to as “uninsured
drivers”,4 and they are subject to fines and other penalties if caught driving without
insurance.5
Police have historically been limited in their ability to identify uninsured drivers at
low cost, in order to enforce these laws. Typically, proof of insurance is provided by
a printed or electronic version of an ID card produced by the insurance company. An
insurance policy may be canceled before the end of the policy term, with a prorated
premium returned to the driver for any unused days, but the ID card is not revoked.
As the Kansas Legislative Research Department (2015) report confirms: “States’
motor vehicle departments have reported increasing problems with fraudulent cards
and with motorists paying for insurance and then canceling that insurance but keeping
the card.”
In 1995, Utah implemented a new law which required all insurers in the state to
contribute to a database of insured drivers, and allowed police access to this database
in order to enforce insurance laws. In 1999, Nebraska introduced a similar law, with
Missouri adding a “Book of Business” (BOB) law in the year 2000. In 2004, South
4The term “uninsured driver” is a misnomer, as insurance policies apply to vehicles, with the
insurance extending to the current driver of the vehicle, unless certain restrictions or named-driver
exclusions apply.
5It is impossible to directly observe the number of uninsured drivers in a state, as these drivers
have an incentive to avoid detection so that they do not face the associated penalties. However,
the literature generally estimates the proportion of uninsured drivers as the fraction of accidents
involving an uninsured motorist claim, divided by the total number of accidents involving a bodily
injury claim. I follow Ernest (2018) in using this method to estimate uninsured rates for this paper.
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Carolina added an Online Verification (OLV) requirement which allowed police real-
time access to an insurer’s current written policies. This access removed any delays
which could cause a “false positive” result of when a driver had cancelled a policy after
the last time the insurer updated the database. By 2014, 15 states had implemented
one or both of these types of laws, with at least 5 more states joining in by 2017.
Table 2.1 displays the year and type of law for each participating state.
2.2.1 Verifying Insurance Coverage
In order for police officers to enforce laws requiring drivers to maintain automobile
insurance, there must be a way for drivers to demonstrate to police that they have ac-
quired the necessary coverage. Traditionally, this was handled through requirements
for insurers in each state to provide drivers with an ID Card listing the insurance
coverages the driver had purchased for the policy period.6 This ID card would be
presented to police during a traffic stop or other interaction, in order to verify cover-
age.7 However, if a driver cancels the insurance policy, he is not forced to return the
ID card. For police officers, there was not previously a low cost way of verifying that
the information on the card was correct.
In response to this issue, states have begun implementing two types of laws to improve
the ability of police to determine the validity of an insurance policy. Beginning in
1995, Utah was the first state to implement a “Book of Business” (BOB) law, which
requires all insurers in a state to upload their entire book of business to a police
accessible statewide database of insured drivers on a periodic basis.8 As of 2014, a
6A typical automobile insurance policy provides coverage for six months before it must be re-
newed.
7Driving without insurance is considered a secondary offense in all states, and therefore a driver
cannot be stopped solely on the suspicion of driving without insurance.
8See Figures 1.4 & 1.5 for diagrams of these procedures.
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total of 13 states had laws requiring BOB reporting. Later, technology progressed
to make possible another way for police to verify an insurance policy, through an
immediate direct electronic connection to the insurance companies writing policies in
the state. These “Online Verification” (OLV) laws provide additional assurance that
the insurance policy is currently in effect at the time of the officer’s inquiry. Table 2.1
provides the states and year of implementation for each type of law. For my analysis I
consider OLV and BOB laws together, as the laws are similar in nature and ultimate
intention.
2.3 State-Specific Factors
There are many variables which could prove to be factors in a state legislature deciding
to implement an auto insurance database law. Some of these variables may influence
the calculus of relative costs and benefits of mandating such a program, while others
provide an indication of the unique preferences present in the state. I discuss the
relevant factors for my analysis in this section.
2.3.1 Proportion of Uninsured Drivers
The urgency to pass a law to combat uninsured driving could reasonably be associated
with the amount of uninsured driving in the state. The percentage of drivers who
do not possess minimum insurance coverage varies substantially across states, from
less than 4% to more than 30%. One could assume that states with more uninsured
driving would be more likely to implement a database law to help identify and stop
these uninsured drivers. However, it is also possible that states with few uninsured
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drivers are more likely to implement such a law, as these states may place a higher
value on keeping uninsured driving to a minimum. As database laws are one tool
among many for deterring uninsured driving, these states could already be placing
more emphasis on minimizing uninsured driving through other methods.9
2.3.1.1 Measurement
Directly observing the number of uninsured drivers in a state is impossible, but the
proportion of drivers without insurance can be estimated. Khazzoom (2000) provides
discussion of the limitations of several methods of estimation. For this paper, I follow
Ernest (2018) in calculating the uninsured motorist rate using Equation 2.1. This
measure estimates the percentage of uninsured motorists as the fraction of accidents






This measure may include accidents involving drivers registered in other states, who
would not be directly affected by the database regulation. Drivers’ insurance require-
ments are based on their home state. While this insurance follows the driver across
state lines, the database policy studied in this paper is state specific, and therefore
doesn’t provide a new mechanism for immediately identifying the insurance status
of out-of-state drivers. The database laws currently being implemented also do not
provide the ability for police to immediately verify the insurance status of out-of-state
drivers. However, if several neighboring states were to successfully implement new
9Other methods which are not explicitly considered in this paper could include such efforts as
increased or more targeted policing.
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agreements in the future, database laws could be made more effective by allowing
officers in a state to access the out-of-state databases of uninsured drivers.
2.3.2 Demographic Factors
Demographic factors may play a large role in a state’s decision to pass a database law.
State-level factors which represent unique characteristics of the state could affect this
decision in two ways. The preferences of constituents, and relevant interest groups,
may differ, and the overall effect of enforcement will depend on demographic factors
as well. For example, a state with a high poverty rate may feel less pressure from
wealthy drivers who are concerned they will be involved in accidents with uninsured
drivers, but the state could also find it more difficult to collect fines and penalties
from poorer uninsured drivers.
2.3.3 Concentration of Insurance Providers
Complying with the requirements of an insurance database law is costly for insurance
companies, but these costs are not necessarily equally spread among all competitors.
The fixed cost associated with setting up technology to provide the required informa-
tion to the database puts smaller insurers at a disadvantage, as they must spread the
fixed costs across fewer policies.10 To investigate the influence of insurers in lobbying
for or against these laws, I construct a Herfindahl Index (HHI) as a measure of the
market share held by the top insurers in each state. I predict that states with market
10States have acknowledged the regulatory burden that these laws may place on especially small
insurers, and often include an exemption for insurers that write fewer that 500 policies in the state.
However, this exemption limits the effectiveness of the database laws, as an incomplete database
provides a less reliable tool for police to confidently access to determine a driver’s current insurance
status.
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share concentrated among a handful of insurers will be more likely to pass a database
law. The few large insurers will find the costs of implementation less burdensome
than their smaller competitors, and may expect to capture a large number of new
policyholders who obtain insurance in response to the database law.
2.3.3.1 Insurer Concentration - Herfindahl Index
I measure the relative level of competition among insurers in each state by measuring





Equation 2.2 provides the method of construction for the Herfindahl Index (HHI)
values. The measure considers the market share m of the top 10 insurers in state s
in year y.12 I calculate this measure for HHI(10), which represents the concentration
the top 10 insurers in the state. The values of the HHI range between 0 and 1, with
0 representing perfect competition, and 1 representing monopoly. While the market
share is also measured directly as the sum of the top 4 or top 10 insurers’ market
share in the state, the HHI measure provides more information on how the market
share is spread among those top insurers.13
11While constructing a true HHI measure would require market share information for all competi-
tors in the state, I construct an HHI measure for the top 10 insurers, which consistently make up
more than 80% of the market in each state year.
12The market share takes a value of 0 ≤ m ≤ 1 where a value of .25 represents a company holding
25% of written premiums in the state in year y.
13For example, if the top 4 insurers each held 20% market share in a state, we would expect them
to behave differently than a state where the top insurer held 77% market share, with the other 3
top insurers each holding 1%.
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2.3.4 Regional Diffusion Theory
While the specific characteristics of a state may influence legislative priorities, states
may also be affected by the actions of other states. As laid out by Walker (1969),
Regional Diffusion Theory would argue that the behavior of neighboring states in
passing these laws would explain the decision of other states to follow suit.14 This
could apply for one of two reasons. First, states may feel pressure from their con-
stituents and interest groups to introduce a law which has been implemented in nearby
states, in order to avoid the appearance of falling-behind or not actively addressing
any perceived issues with uninsured driving. Second, while states are not currently
able to immediately access a database of insured drivers from outside of their par-
ticular state, the widespread adoption of such laws could eventually lead to regional
cooperatives in which states share information to allow out-of-state law enforcement
to access this information in a timely fashion.
2.4 Data
The data for this analysis were aggregated from a variety of sources, and compiled
at the state-year level. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (2017)
(NAIC) reports were used for estimation of Equation 2.1, to determine the rate of
uninsured driving in each state. These reports also provided data on state-specific
factors including average insurance premiums. Specifics of database law implemen-
tation dates were derived from a combination of data from the Property Casualty
14For a similar application, see Hageman and Robb (2011) who provide an example demonstrating
that states exhibit a sort of herding behavior by adopting anti-passive investment company laws more
often when other states within their particular Bureau of Economic Analysis region have adopted
the laws.
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Insurers Association of America (PCI) and Verisk Solutions (2015). I include data
on the market share of auto insurance companies in each state and year. These data
measure market share by the amount of written premiums for the top 10 insurers, and
are derived from the NAIC’s annual ’Market Share Reports for Property/Casualty
Groups and Companies’ spanning 2004-2014. Data on the number of licensed drivers
are from the Federal Highway Administration, the National Center for Statistics and
Analysis (2017) provides data on annual miles driven, and the US Census provides
additional demographic data.
2.4.1 Summary Statistics
The data for this paper span an 11 year period of observation, including 49 states
and the District of Columbia.15 During this time, a total of 13 states implemented a
database law, in addition to three states which had laws in place before 2004.
Summary statistics for variables of interest are presented in Table 2.2. An estimated
average of 15.96% of drivers were uninsured across the 11 years in my sample data
set. Market share for the top four insurers, as measured by total written premiums
for each company by state, ranged from a low of 38.8% in 2004 Connecticut to over
76% in 2015 Alaska. For the HHI measure, a score of 1 would represent a monopoly,
while scores approaching 0 represent highly competitive markets. HHI(10) scores
range from a low of 0.06 in the competitive market in 2007 Maine to over 0.18 in the
less competitive 2009 District of Columbia market.




2.5.1 Estimating Contributing Factors
I estimate the impact of the various factors discussed above on a state implementing a
database law using Ordinary Least Squares estimation as seen in Equation 2.3.
Databasest = β0 + β1HHIst + β2PropUMst + Xβ3 + st (2.3)
This equation evaluates the relative impact of the proportion of uninsured motorists
in a state “PropUM ”, the level of competition in the state’s insurance market “HHI ”,
the state’s willingness to enforce its uninsured motorist laws through large fines for
non-compliance “Fine”, and a variety of other controls on a state’s likelihood of
implementing an insurance database law.16
2.6 Results
Table 2.3 provides the results of the above analysis. After controlling for several likely
factors, there remains a small significant impact of the rate of uninsured driving on
a state implementing a database law. In fact, a state with more uninsured drivers is
less likely to implement such a law. This supports the hypothesis that states with
already low rates of uninsured driving implement the database law as one additional
tool to keep those rates low.
The results also demonstrate that market concentration of insurers may play a role
16Similarly, I replace the HHI variable with Market Share(4), to test the effect of the concentration
of the top four insurers in each market.
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in states’ legislative decisions to implement a database law. In fact, the more con-
centrated the market is, the less likely the state will be to implement a database
law.
Interestingly, while the presence of No Fault laws are significantly and positively
correlated with database laws, there is no significant correlation between a state
having a “No Pay, No Play” law and a database law.
2.6.1 Diffusion Theory
State specific factors play a role in the state passing a database law, but neighboring
states’ actions seem to play a role as well. Following Utah’s implementation of the
first database law in 1995, 14 states implemented their own laws over the following
20 years. Nine of the 14 states, over 64%, shared at least one border with a state
that had a database law in place at the time. Figure 1.8.2 demonstrates how these
states eventually stretched from coast to coast, but rarely in a state that is separated
from other states that had tested the law first. This trend continued after the sample
period, with the laws spreading to the northeast for the first time, and four of the five
states implementing the law between 2015-2017 bordering a state that had already
passed a database law. This provides some initial support for the idea that states are
influenced to pass laws similar to those adopted by their geographic neighbors.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper evaluates the factors which lead states to implement a law aimed at
reducing the amount of uninsured driving in the state. Specifically, I focus on the
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role that market concentration and uninsured motorist rates play in this decision.
I find that states with high rates of uninsured driving are not the most likely to
implement a law requiring a database of insured drivers. Instead, the database law is
more likely to be enacted in states that already have lower-than-average proportions
of uninsured motorists.
To an extent, market concentration in the auto insurance industry also plays a role.
I construct a Herfindahl Index and determine that states in which most policies are
sold by a few large insurers are less likely to pass a database law. These insurers may
be better organized and able to lobby against the laws which would force additional
costs of compliance upon them.
Finally, I investigate the applicability of Regional Diffusion Theory in explaining why
states implement these laws. This theory would suggest that states feel more pressure
to implement the law when their neighboring states have the law in place. I find some
initial support for this theory, with almost two-thirds of new state database laws by
2014 being passed in states which border at least one state that had already adopted
the law.
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2.8 Tables and Figures
2.8.1 Tables
Table 2.1: Online Verification and Book of Business Implementation Dates
Implementation Online Book of














MT 2012 X X
AL 2013 X X
UTc 2013 X
WV 2013 X X
CT 2015 X X
RI 2015 X
LA 2016 X X
MS 2017 X
TN 2017 X
Note: My sample contains data for 2004 - 2014. The three states
in dark gray had laws in place spanning the entire sample period,
while the five states in light gray did not implement OLV or BOB
laws until after the sample period.
a South Carolina and California allow for voluntary participation
of insurers in the Online Verification program.
b Texas is excluded from all analysis, as the data necessary to cal-
culate the proportion of uninsured motorists are not available.
c Utah’s 2013 law introduced Online Verification requirements
which updated the ’Insure-Rite’ Book of Business program that
had made Utah a pioneer in auto insurance enforcement programs
in 1995.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
Descriptive Statistics
Mean Min Max Source
(Std Dev)
Uninsured Motorist Rate 15.96 3.16 35.86 NAIC Database Reports
(5.79)
HHI(10) .102 .0556 .1861 NAIC Market Share Reports
(.0242)
Market Share (4) .5466 .3882 .7675 NAIC Market Share Reports
(.0674)
Fatalities 671.44 15 4333 FARS
(654.98)
Total Crash Per Mil. Driver 32195.84 9249.25 59143.54 Annual State Crash Facts
(9249.25)
Fatal Crash Per Mil. Driver 178.499 44.89 432.74 Annual State Crash Facts
(70.77)
Fine 653.50 0.00 5000.00 CFA Report
(in $s) (794.29)
Average Premium 783.89 503.00 1263.67 NAIC Database Reports
(in $s) (175.51)
No Pay, No Play 0.20 0 1 IRC
(0.40)
No Fault 0.24 0 1 IRC
(0.43)
Urban 72.89 38.20 100 Census, CPS Data
(15.07)
Poverty 13.14 5.40 25.75 Census, CPS Data
(3.50)
N 550
Note: Summary statistics cover yearly observations for 50 states from 2004-2014. Uninsured Motorist Rate is
the estimated number of drivers with no insurance per 100 drivers. HHI and Market Share are calculated based
on the total written premiums of the top 4 and 10 insurers per state and year. Fatalities and Total Crashes
are annual measurements at the state level. Fine is measured as the maximum fine for a first offense of driving
without insurance. Average Premium is measured as the average amount paid for a policyholder to purchase
one year of insurance coverage in the state. No Pay, No Play and No Fault are indicators equal to 1 when a
state has the respective law in place. Urban measures the proportion of a state’s population living in an urban
area, and Poverty represents the proportion of a state’s population living below the poverty line.
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Table 2.3: Effect of Market Concentration and Uninsured Motorist Rate on Database
Law
MS4 HHI10
Market Share / HHI -0.00371∗ -0.919
(0.00220) (0.642)
Prop Uninsured -0.00682∗∗∗ -0.00694∗∗∗
(0.00234) (0.00233)




No Pay, No Play -0.0245 -0.0246
(0.0292) (0.0294)










Robust standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable Presence of Database. 50 states, 2004-2014.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Chapter 3
Sunsetting Yourself Up for
Success: A Model of Legislative
Usage of Sunset Provisions
3.1 Introduction
This paper investigates alternative motivations for the use of sunset provisions1, which
are a legislative tool used to enact a law that will cease to exist at some finite time in
the future, unless renewed. Modern usage of the sunset provision is widely attributed2
to University of Chicago political theorist Theodore J. Lowi who proposed the general
idea of sunsetting in his 1969 book The End of Liberalism. Lowi proposed these
provisions as a way to motivate the continual review of government bureaucracies, by
1I borrow the definition of a sunset provision from Kysar (2016), who defines ’sunset provision’ “to
mean ’those clauses that cause legislation to expire by its own terms.’ This definition is derived from
Black’s Law Dictionary which defines a ’sunset law’ as a ’statute under which a governmental agency
or program automatically terminates at the end of a fixed period unless it is formally renewed.’”
2See Mooney (2004).
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forcing the legislature to vote every five to 10 years to reauthorize the agencies, or
else they would disappear. Thus, one explanation for the use of sunset provisions is
to force the review of laws, or agencies created by those laws, in order to weed out any
that are no longer functioning properly.3,4 However, this is not the only application
of sunset provisions which has been observed.
A second argument has portrayed the use of sunset provisions as a valuable tool for
enacting legislation when the effects of the law are not fully known, but there is some
urgency to have a law in place. For example, the USA PATRIOT Act, enacted shortly
after the attacks of September 11, 2001, was originally set to expire on December
31, 2005.5 The use of a sunset provision allows legislators to “test” a policy, with
less fear that inefficient policies will become entrenched when the transactions costs
associated with passing new legislation to remove them become greater than the costs
of inefficiency associated with the law staying in place.
In this paper, I contend that a third motivation exists for including a sunset provision
in legislation. It is possible that there is no uncertainty as to the effect of a law, yet
a bill may still pass with the inclusion of a sunset provision. I argue that the usage
of sunset provisions is not necessarily based on a concern that bad legislation will
persist indefinitely, nor because of an urgency for a law to be enacted without proper
time for review and consideration, but rather is motivated by a strategic game in
which legislators use limits on the lifetime of the law as a concession in order to build
a winning coalition for the legislation. For example, if Congress were attempting to
pass a ban on assault weapons, the bill’s proposer could include a sunset provision
3Davis (1981) points out that the burden of proof is thus in proving that a program or agency
remains effective in order to avoid being disbanded. The author notes that the requirements for this
proof are often ill-defined.
4Adams and Sherman (1978) go so far as to refer to sunset legislation as “one of the most
significant public management issues of the 1970’s”.
5See Fahrenthold (2012).
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when doing so were a viable way of swaying enough marginal voters to gain a winning
coalition for the legislation.
While sunset provisions are a potentially useful tool for passing legislation, limiting
the duration of a policy will not always be the least costly avenue for a bill author to
obtain a winning coalition. In one case, a bill may gain a winning coalition without
ever having to concede a limited time of enactment for the law. This is likely achieved
by adjusting the content of the bill itself, rather than the duration of its enactment.
In other cases, even limiting a law to an extremely short duration may not be enough
to obtain a majority. I focus on the cases between these two scenarios, where the use
of sunsets may be a necessary and sufficient bargaining tool.
Figure B.1 demonstrates the increased usage of sunset provisions as a legislative tool
in one area of legislative purview; the tax code.6 This figure paints a clear picture
of the increased impact of sunset provisions after the turn of the century. It is not
clear whether provisions are being used for a larger number of bills, for only those
bills with a more significant impact, or both. In this paper, I offer one explanation of
why legislators are relying more heavily on sunset provisions as a legislative tool in
recent decades.
A Washington Post article, Fahrenthold (2012), quotes Senator Dianne Feinstein as
an example of how legislators can be enticed by sunset provisions:
6Note: The example of the increased usage of sunset provisions as a tool in the tax code is not
necessarily representative of the overall level of usage across different types of legislation. However,
anecdotal evidence does point towards increased use in many areas, as evidenced in the examples
given throughout this paper.
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...tax cuts approved under President George W. Bush in 2001 and 2003.
These originally carried a sunset date in 2010. That provision was added
so the cuts could pass with a simple majority while also calming many
lawmakers worried about the deficit. “This bill contains sunset provi-
sions - critical to my decision to support this legislation - which
will allow us to revisit the components of this bill in the future.”
[Emphasis Added] Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) told her colleagues
back in 2001.
The suggestion that a sunset provision would “allow us to revisit the components of
the bill” supports the idea that bill reconsideration is otherwise a costly endeavor.
By requiring legislators to revisit legislation at some prescribed time in the future, a
sunset provides a prolonged form of agenda-setting in which current legislators can
force issues to be reconsidered when the sunset period arrives.
I evaluate the decision of whether to include a sunset provision based on each party’s
expectation of maintaining or regaining control of the legislature in the following
period. I suggest several methods of estimating these probabilities, and discuss the
resulting effect on the likelihood of sunset provision use under a varied set of condi-
tions. I predict that sunset provisions will be used more frequently when control of the
legislature is more volatile, or when the size of the legislative majority is slim.
3.2 Literature Review
The field of public choice has focused on many aspects of the legislative bargaining
and decision making process. In “Public Choice and Legislation,” Tollison (1988)
provides an overview and more specifically discusses the value to interest groups of
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long-lasting (or “durable”) laws. Maltzman and Shipan (2008) examine how soon and
how often laws are revisited and amended after their initial implementation, finding
that divided government and differences in ideological beliefs between the upper and
lower legislative branches influence the likelihood of amending a law.7 Likewise,
Landes and Posner (1975) argue that an independent judiciary extends the durability
of laws. These findings help explain why the cost of revisiting and ending a law mean
that the vast majority of laws are not immediately overturned when another party
gains a majority. The authors also discuss a second cause of legislation’s durability,
namely the rules and structure of the legislature itself. I address this idea from a
different angle. I focus directly on the concept that explicitly limiting a law’s duration
serves as a bargaining chip in gaining a consensus for the passage of that law.
The increased use of sunset provisions has not gone unnoticed by other disciplines
as well. Much of the focus has centered around two areas; whether permanent or
temporary legislation should be the default choice in prudent lawmaking, and the
impact of sunsets when applied to budgetary and tax policies.
A debate exists in the literature over whether or not sunset provisions should be the
default type of legislation. Gersen (2006) argues, first, that this type of legislation
has been used quite prevalently in the United States since the nation was founded.8
7Maltzman and Shipan acknowledge that sunset provisions “are likely to be caused by the same
factors that also determine legislative durability.” They account for sunset provisions in their analysis
specifically because sunset provisions could be aimed at increasing the probability of laws being
significantly revised in some future period. However they do not explicitly consider the use of
sunsets as purely a legislative bargaining tool.
8Thomas Jefferson was a strong proponent limiting the duration of all laws to a generation.
Jefferson (1789) argues in his letters to James Madison: “On similar ground it may be proved that
no society can make a perpetual constitution, or even a perpetual law. The earth belongs always to
the living generation. They may manage it then, and what proceeds from it, as they please, during
their usufruct. They are masters too of their own persons, and consequently may govern them as
they please. But persons and property make the sum of the objects of government. The constitution
and the laws of their predecessors extinguished then in their natural course with those who gave them
being.” Jefferson’s idea of generational sovereignty would entail that even constitutions would be
limited in duration, so as not to give the current generation undue power of their successors.
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Gersen then makes the case that “within certain well-specified policy domains, tempo-
rary legislation should be embraced as the rule rather eschewed even as an exception.”
However, Gersen’s focus is on whether temporary or permanent legislation should be
the default choice, rather than specifically focusing on the legislator’s marginal deci-
sion of whether to include a sunset provision as a bargaining tool. For the purposes
of my model, I assume that laws are initially written as permanent legislation, with
the choice being made of whether to include a sunset (and of what duration).
Kysar (2016) argues that sunset provisions are not ideal, as applied to tax policies,
as they “reduce the reliability of revenue estimates and [create] substantial obstacles
to the re-enactment of certain budget rules.” Kysar also argues that the proponents
of sunset provisions fail to acknowledge the additional opportunities for rent-seeking
created by more frequent deadlines and discussions of legislation.9
In addition to the costs and benefits associated with a law’s durability, studies have
even examined the impact of sunset provision use on legislative attitudes.10 Rather
than attempting to settle the debate on the overall benefits or costs to society intro-
duced by sunset provisions, I instead contribute to the literature by focusing specifi-
cally on the political decision of when to utilize a sunset provision to obtain a winning
coalition in support of a piece of legislation.
9Kysar (2011) argues for a tendency towards lasting legislation, noting “temporary legislation
increases rents from interest groups, entrenches current majoritarian preferences, and produces plan-
ning conundrums for public and private actors alike.”
10For example, Lyons and Freeman (1984) found that introducing sunset legislation in Tennessee
led to more understanding and cooperation, as well as an increased tendency toward other forms of
oversight, for both the legislators and agency officials. Hamm and Robertson (2006) look at U.S.
states and finds that states with low levels of legislative professionalism and little oversight tend to
be the first to use sunset provisions.
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3.3 Model
The model constructed in this paper examines how the use of sunset provisions in
legislation enables proponents of a bill to build a winning coalition. The model
considers whether or not a sunset provision is included in a piece of legislation and, if
so, the amount of time before the sunset occurs. A 2-party model is considered, with
several possibilities for informing the legislators’ expectations of when the legislative
majority will change to the other party’s control. This expectation impacts the choice
of members of the opposing party as to whether or not to support the bill. The
model considers adding a sunset provision as a form of concession to entice additional
legislators to support the proposed legislation.
3.3.1 Assumptions
Several simplifying assumptions are made in the creation of this model. These as-
sumptions may be relaxed, with varying degrees of significance in changing outcomes.
The assumptions include the following:
• Members of the legislature belong to one of two parties.
• The majority party consists of a simple majority of legislative members. A
coinflip decides the majority in the case of a tie. Alternatively, one could assume
an odd number of legislators, although this would not necessarily prevent ties
if the two-party assumption were relaxed.
• All legislation is initially written as “permanent” legislation, which if enacted
will remain in effect indefinitely.
• No amendments are permitted to the content (“quality”) of the proposed legis-
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lation; however
• A sunset provision, limiting a law’s effective duration to length of time “t”, may
be added to the legislation; t ∈ [0,∞]
– Note: A sunset of infinite length is equivalent to no sunset provision being
included
• Enacted legislation containing a sunset provision may be reconsidered before
the scheduled sunset at a cost, Crecon on the proposer of the reconsideration.
3.3.2 Model
A randomly chosen member of the minority party proposes a law with a specified level
of content, q. The legislator attempts to maximize his utility by garnering enough
votes to pass this legislation, which must be achieved by acquiring votes from the
opposing party in order to reach a simple majority. The content, q, of the bill is
assumed to be held fixed, but votes can be won by limiting the time during which
the proposed law will be in effect.
The proposing legislator maximizes the following equation:




T (1− δ) (3.2)
• T ≡ the duration of the proposed law before sunset
• qR ≡ the “quality” or value of the content of the bill for a Republican legislator.
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• qD ≡ the “quality” or value of the content of the bill for a Democratic legislator.
• ND ≡ the number of votes received from Democrats in favor of the bill.
• NT ≡ the threshold number of Democratic voters required, in order for the bill
to receive a majority of votes in favor.
• δ ≡ the expected probability that Democrats remain in power.
• (1− δ) ≡ the expected probability that Republicans transition into power.
In Equation 3.2, legislators in the minority party, one of whom proposes the leg-
islation, attempt to maximize their utility by passing a law. The legislator of the
proposing party prefers a longer duration, T , of the law, and values the fixed content
of the law at qR. ND−NT represents the difference between the threshold number of
votes needed from the other party in order to obtain a majority, (NT ), and the actual
number of votes in favor of the legislation received from the other party (ND). When
this difference is equal to zero, the bill receives the minimum number of votes needed
to pass.
3.3.2.1 Comparative Statics
With “quality” (q) treated as an exogenous variable which has already been deter-
mined, the proposing legislator attempts to adjust T to limit the duration of the bill
only as is necessary to garner a majority of votes for the bill.
δLR
δT
= (1− α)qαRT−α + (−1)
λqD







where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1; 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1; 0 ≤ qD; and 0 ≤ qR.
Analyzing Equation 3.4, it can be seen that a longer duration for the law’s effective-
ness, T , will be chosen when the majority (non-proposing) party finds more value in
the “quality”, qD, of the legislation. Because the opposing party appreciates the bill
more, less of a concession in duration is necessary in order to win their vote. Similarly,
when the proposing party values the quality of the bill, qR, more highly, the optimal
duration will be shorter, as the proposing party is more willing to limit the duration
of the law to ensure its passage.
In addition, α can be thought of as the relative weight the legislator places on the
quality of the bill, as compared to the weight placed on the law’s duration. As the
relative weight on quality is higher, bills are expected to sunset more quickly.
Lastly, the (1 − δ) term represents the likelihood that the minority party, which is
proposing the legislation, will retake power. The higher the expected likelihood that
power will transition, the shorter will be the optimal duration before a law’s sunset.
There are several methods by which the variable, δ, may be endogenously determined.
These methods are discussed in the following section.
11See Appendix for full derivation
63
3.3.3 Estimating Probability of Transition
If Democrats are the current majority party in the legislature, there is some proba-
bility, δ that they maintain that majority, with (1 − δ) representing the probability
that the majority transitions to the Republicans.
δ ≡ Pr(Majt+1 = D|Majt = D) (3.5)
(1− δ) ≡ Pr(Majt+1 = R|Majt = D) (3.6)
Similarly, if Republicans hold the majority, the probability of transition may dif-
fer.
ρ ≡ Pr(Majt+1 = R|Majt = R) (3.7)
(1− ρ) ≡ Pr(Majt+1 = D|Majt = R) (3.8)
I consider a variety of ways in which legislators may consider the current makeup of
the legislature, as well as historical trends, in order to estimate δ and ρ.
Table 3.1 provides historical data on how often this transition has occurred in the U.S.
House of Representatives. With elections held for all legislators every two years, there
have been 81 elections, with power transitioning 18 times. On average, Democrats
have maintained majority power longer, lasting between 1 and 20 sessions before
losing power, with an average of 5 sessions before Republicans took over. When
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Republicans have held power, they have maintained it for 1 to 8 sessions, with an
average of 4.
3.3.3.1 Historical Average
One method of estimating the probability of transition is to assume that the probabil-
ity of transition for the party currently in power is equal to the sum of the number of
periods for which the party lost power after an election, divided by the total number
of times the party was in power. Table 3.2 provides this estimate for the probability
of the legislative majority switching power, based on the current state.
(ρ) ≡ # Elections Republicans Maintained Majority
Total # of Elections while Republicans were in Majority Power
(3.9)
For this estimate, I assume that representatives view the likelihood of a switch next
period simply as the average likelihood of their party regaining power between 1858-
2018.12 Figure 3.1 displays the probability of switching based on these assumptions,
as presented in a Markov chain.
As more periods are observed, these estimates are updated each period with the new
average likelihood of transition. For each estimate, all periods are weighted equally,
no matter how recent.
This estimate assumes that there is an equal chance of transition in each period, no
matter the size of the majority, and without taking any other relevant information
into account.
12Data on party control of congress were compiled using vital statistics provided by the U.S.House
(House) of Representatives website, house.gov.
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3.3.3.2 Size of Majority
It is likely that a legislature in which there is a slim majority will have a different prob-
ability of transition than a legislature with in which one party has a large majority.13
Table 3.3 provides a slightly more complex example of how legislators may predict
when the majority party will next transition. This table estimates the probability of
transition based on historical trends of transition while also taking into account the
size of the majority.
Under this estimation method, the probability of a transition is, in part, a function of
the size of the majority. A simple functional form could involve taking the difference
in the number of seats held by the majority party and those of the minority party,
while more complex functions could be assumed which allow for larger majorities to
imply a greater likelihood of transition. Under the first assumption, this estimation
method predicts that the majority party is more likely to stay in power when the
majority is larger. Under the second set of assumptions, a larger majority could
indicate a the likelihood of some negative shock for the majority party, which could
affect a large number of elections and make transition of power more likely.
3.3.4 Cost of Proposal
A sunset provision would not be useful if there were no cost associated with introduc-
ing legislation to end a law that is currently in place. In this model, legislators are
13In this paper, I use data for the U.S. House of Representatives, for which all members face
elections every two years. Thus, it is always possible for a transition in the majority party to occur
during any election. If the model is extended to include legislative bodies which operate in a different
manner, such as the U.S. Senate, it should be realized that there may be periods where no transition
is possible during one election. For these bodies, a simple historical average probability of transition
may be less informative.
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policy motivated, and must consider the cost of re-introducing a bill before the sunset
period, which could include time spent researching and debating the legislation, as
well as any loss of political capital spent in the renegotiation process.14
If the bill fails to pass, legislators have endured the costs of introducing and debating
the bill, but do not receive any of the benefits associated with the bill’s passage.
Thus, there is a strong incentive for all players to work towards finding a version of
the bill that will pass, using the available mechanism of sunset provision duration
adjustments.
3.3.5 Players and Preferences
The players in this model consist of N legislators representing two political parties,
D and R. Each legislator has preferences over a proposed law which are determined
by the content of the law as well as the duration. These preferences stretch along a
uni-dimensional policy space. For instance, if a bill is proposed by a member of the
majority party, Legislatori will take into account her preference for the content of the
bill, which will typically be stronger for members of the same party than for those of
the opposing party, and also whether the bill creates the law indefinitely or only for a
limited time. Thus, members are policy motivated. They are concerned with which
laws will be in place, both now and in the future, but they do not derive additional
utility from holding the office themselves.
14I have explicitly chosen not to allow the cost of bringing up legislation early to vary with
the length of time before the sunset period ends. This is to allow these costs to be thought of
as the opportunity costs of a legislator’s limited time to consider proposals in each period. The




1. A member of the legislature’s minority party is randomly chosen to propose a
bill.
2. The content of the bill, measured as “quality”, is determined.
3. The legislator chooses whether to add a sunset provision of duration “t” periods
to the bill.
4. Legislators vote their true preferences for or against the bill.
5. If the bill passes, the policy is enacted for the specified time period.
6. In the sunset period, if applicable, the bill is reconsidered by the legislature at
cost Crec < C, or the policy is allowed to end at 0 additional cost.
3.3.7 The Economic Model
The legislators in this model cast a vote for or against proposed legislation in order to
maximize their individual utility. A legislator may be convinced to vote for a law for
two reasons. First, if the legislator’s preferred policy is relatively close to the proposed
policy, the legislator will derive positive utility from the passage of the legislation,
and will accrue more utility the longer the law is expected to remain in effect. For a
legislator whose preferred policy is farther from the proposed policy (perhaps she is
in the minority party), the legislator prefers a more imminent sunset period for the
legislation, to force its reconsideration in the near future. However, each legislator
hopes to strategically set the sunset period during a time in which she believes her
party will have gained the majority, so that the amendment or repeal of the law will
lead to a policy which is closer to her ideal point.
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3.3.8 The Political Model
The political model involves building a coalition of legislators in order to obtain a sim-
ple majority in favor of the proposer’s legislation. Legislators are policy motivated,
and do not directly derive any utility explicitly from holding office. Legislators are
elected to the legislative body through elections in their districts, and declare affilia-
tions to one of the two parties. The results of these elections each period determine
which party has a legislative majority in that period.
3.3.9 Equilibrium
The model presented here predicts when legislators use sunset provisions as a form
of concession to opponents, in order to build a coalition for their legislation. The
proposer offers a sunset provision of a duration just short enough to incentivize a
sufficient number of marginal voters to cast their votes in favor of the legislation, in
order to gain a majority. If a majority can be obtained without offering a sunset
provision, then t = ∞, with no sunset included. The utility maximizing duration
of t is chosen based on the estimates of ρ or δ15, the probability of majority control
transitioning to the other party.
3.4 Implications
The model predicts that sunset provisions will be used more often, and the length
of time before sunset will be shorter, when a transition in political power is more
15When Republicans hold majority power, ρ estimates the probability of transition, while δ is the
measure when Democrats currently hold the majority.
69
likely. The legislator proposing the legislation finds this concession to be necessary
in order to appeal to just enough legislators until a majority coalition is obtained.
Additionally, the predicted length of time before the sunset is longer as the majority
party controls a larger percentage of the legislative body.
While the size of majority is a predictive factor in the use and duration of sunset pro-
visions, the direction of the effect is uncertain. A large majority does not necessarily
entail a smaller probability of a transition in majority power. For example, “wave
elections” in which there is sharp shift ushering in many new officials could occur
more commonly when there is a large majority. On the other hand, wave elections
could take place with the minority party gaining a large number of seats in the next
election, but still failing to capture a majority.16 The result is an uncertain effect of
majority size on sunset provision duration.
For example, if legislators consider the size of the current majority as an indicator
of the likelihood of party control switching, then the Democratic Party holding a
two-member majority in the U.S. House may lead to a relatively high expectation of
Republicans taking transitioning into power. Furthermore, if the historical average
number of seats gained or lost in each election were relatively high (say on average
a 150 seat swing out of the 435 contested seats in an election), then the probability
of the majority party losing power is increased.17 Under this scenario, the shorter
sunsets would be used to pass less durable laws. This is the case for two reasons.
16Trende (2018) discusses each of these possibilities. “In a way, the concept of a wave is irrelevant.
Years like 1954, where Democrats barely gained seats but still flipped the House, are probably more
consequential than a major wave year like 1922, where Democrats gained over 70 seats but failed to
capture the chamber.”
17There are two ways to consider the “relative” amount of seats gained or lost. First, one could
compare the number of seats gained or lost in some number of recent elections (perhaps the past 5
elections), versus the historical average. Second, one could consider the percentage of seats gained
or lost in comparison to elections of other bodies, whether comparing the U.S. House to the U.S.
Senate, to state legislatures, or to some other comparable body.
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The first is that the proposing party prefers to pass a bill, but finds it less costly for
the bill to sunset when the party is likely to have gained a majority, because there
would then be an easier path towards extending the law or adjusting the content.
The second is that the majority party knows that if it is able to maintain power,
or regain power before the bill sunsets, it will be less costly to endure the law for
a short period of time and then choose from one of two possibilities. The majority
party could let the legislation die without bringing it back up for debate, or introduce
a new or amended version of the bill that better suits the policy preferences of that
party. Each of these options is available under the assumption that it is more costly
to reconsider a bill before the sunset period has elapsed.
As the makeup of the legislative body and amount of volatility in maintaining a
majority tends to move in a cyclical pattern over time, I would not expect the use
of sunset provisions to continue increasing at the current pace. Instead, the use
would be expected to follow similar cycles, based on the variables of interest outlined
above.
3.5 Empirical Tests
Tests of this model’s predictions are possible by observing particular features of legis-
latures. When a legislature has a high probability of transitioning to a new majority
party, the model predicts more and shorter sunset provisions to be used. Addition-
ally, observing the size of a majority should provide information to assist in predicting
when a sunset is likely to be used.
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3.5.0.1 Stop-Gap Measures
One important empirical test which is not well defined in my model is how often a
sunset provision is set to expire before the next election takes place. This type of stop-
gap measure may serve to limit the cost associated with failing to pass legislation, such
as avoiding sequester by passing a budget with a three month sunset. However, my
model of parties switching majority control does not allow for predictions of this type
of sunset usage, as majority control will typically only change following an election.
Stop-Gap measures likely fall under the other reasons for using sunset legislation
discussed in Section 3.2, which are not the main focus of this paper.
3.5.0.2 Realistic Assumptions
For this paper, I have assumed that a sunset provision required that the law would
be stricken from the books, with nothing to take its place. However, it merits further
consideration of the predictions of this model when a different outcome is used. For
instance, when sunset provisions are used in legislation enacting a yearly budget, fail-
ing to renew the legislation when time elapses will generally lead to the continuation
of some previous year’s budget (potentially a version with adjusted levels of spend-
ing), rather than no budget at all. That is to say, the expiration of the law could
entail a return to something other than the previous status-quo.
For simplicity, I have only considered a unicameral legislature. Clearly, this does not
take into account the necessity of bills in the U.S. Congress to also be passed by the
other chamber, as well as signed by the President. I have also limited any additional
discussion in judicial oversight in prolonging or ending the effects of legislation.
Lastly, future research will focus on not only when sunset provisions are initially
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included, but how often they are extended, and for what length of time. The model
presented in this paper does not fully address the decisions being made during the
sunset period. This is partially due to the fact that the model excludes the possibility
of amendments to the legislation, but the sunset period is a prime opportunity to
apply changes to the law in order to update it to align with current preferences. The
length of any sunset extensions could also be considered, based on updated predictions
of when majority power would be transferred.
3.5.1 Relaxing Assumptions
To what degree does the model presented in this paper represent a simplified but
accurate depiction of legislative bodies? As mentioned above, the assumption of a
unicameral legislature vastly simplifies the interactions between the House, Senate,
and Executive branch which are necessary in order to enact legislation.
Additionally, as mentioned in the Assumptions section, we do not observe a simple
two-party breakdown in Congress. However, relaxing this assumption to allow for
additional parties should not have a significant impact on the predictions of this
model.
The assumption concerning an inability to amend legislation does not accurately
reflect most legislative processes observed in the United States. Relaxing this as-
sumption would dampen the effects predicted in this model. However, there is some
anecdotal evidence that the sunset provision mechanism is not fully overwhelmed
by the option to amend the policy content of legislation. If this were the case, we
would not expect to see any instances of sunset provisions being used. This is clearly
not what we observe in the modern day legislature, even in types of legislation that
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are not focused on temporary tax policy. Thus, a more advanced model could be
constructed which allows for adjustments in both sunset provision usage as well as
amendments to the content of legislation.
3.5.2 Expanding the Model
Additional focus could be placed on estimating the costs of introducing new legisla-
tion, or revisiting laws before the sunset period, and revisting laws during the sunset
period. For the model, I assume that the cost of revisiting a law is higher than the
cost of initial introduction of a bill. The subsequent costs may be higher as laws, pro-
grams, and funding become entrenched and valued by those who benefit from them.
However, the costs could also arise due to the opportunity cost of time. Not only does
a legislator have limited time to craft and propose bills, a legislative body can only
feasibly give consideration to a limited number of bills and resolutions each session.
The more time that a legislator must commit to speaking for or against a bill, having
staff conduct research, and explaining to her constituents her reasoning for votes cast,
the less time she has for considering additional issues. Constituents may see repeated
consideration of a bill as a “waste of time,” and therefore view their representatives
as ineffective. There was a fair amount of negative press surrounding the U.S. House
of Representatives repeated votes to repeal “Obamacare” (The Affordable Care Act),
Walsh (2015), as one example.
An additional cost of frequently requiring the legislature to act on the same legislation
is the effect on perceptions of stability and reliability. With less durable laws, long-
term planning becomes more difficult, and commitments less tractable, when there is
a real and recurring threat to undo or vastly alter laws and regulations. For example,
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the implications of the U.S. Congress increasing the country’s debt ceiling by small
amounts and thus frequently debating whether or not to authorize more increases
have been far reaching. The perceived threat of Congress not raising the debt ceiling
each time it is reached has created enough uncertainty and instability that rating
agency Standard and Poor’s cited it as a reason for downgrading the United States’
credit rating in 2011.18
3.6 Future Considerations
Future extensions of this research will focus on additional variables that may play a
role in the expected value of limited legislation. One avenue to be explored is the
impact of announced retirements on a legislator’s willingness to accept shorter or
longer sunset duration. Polling data will also be incorporated in two ways. First, to
the extent that polling is conducted for an individual law, polling data could provide
good insights into popular opinion on the content of legislation. Second, polling
on popularity and pre-election polling for incumbent candidates could help predict
whether individual legislators expect to be in power during the next period.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper sets forth a third explanation of how and why sunset provisions are in-
cluded in legislation. While others have argued that sunset provisions are used to test
the uncertain effects of legislation, or to provide a less costly check on government bu-
reaucracies, I model the choice of whether to include a sunset provision as motivated
18See James et al. (2011) article for ABC News.
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by a strategic game. In this game, legislators use limits on the lifetime of the law
as a concession in order to build a winning coalition for the legislation. The model
predicts that sunsets will be used more often, with less time before the law expires,
when there is a higher probability of majority party transition. Additionally, sunsets
will be used more often when there is more volatility in legislative majorities.
3.8 Tables and Figures
3.8.1 Tables
Table 3.1: Historical Majority Party Transitions - U.S. House of Representatives
TOTAL Democratic Republican Rep Take Sessions before
Election Year Congress Democrats Republicans Other
Representatives Gain/Loss Gain/Loss Control Switch
1858 36 83 116 39 238 -49 26 1 1
1874 44 182 103 8 293 94 -96 0 8
1880 47 128 151 14 293 -13 19 1 3
1882 48 196 117 12 325 68 -34 0 1
1888 51 152 179 1 332 -15 27 1 3
1890 52 238 86 8 332 86 -93 0 1
1894 54 93 254 10 357 -125 130 1 2
1910 62 230 162 2 394 58 -57 0 8
1918 66 192 240 2 435 -22 25 1 4
1930 72 216 218 1 435 52 -52 0 6
1946 80 188 246 1 435 -56 57 1 8
1948 81 263 171 1 435 75 -75 0 1
1952 83 213 221 1 435 -22 22 1 2
1954 84 232 203 0 435 19 -18 0 1
1994 104 204 230 0 435 -54 54 1 20
2006 110 233 202 0 435 32 -31 0 6
2010 112 193 242 0 435 -64 64 1 2
2018 116 235 199 1 435 41 -42 0 4
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Table 3.2: Estimated Probability Party Majority Next Period





Note: Based on simple historical average of probability of switching party control, 1858-2018.
Table 3.3: Estimated Probability Party Majority Next Period - Size of Majority
Prob. Control Next Period
Current Control
Party D R
D (Dleg −Rleg) ∗ δ 1− [(Dleg −Rleg) ∗ δ]
R (Rleg −Dleg) ∗ ρ 1− [(Rleg −Dleg) ∗ ρ]
Note: Based on historical size of majority in period before party switches party control, 1858-2018.
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3.8.2 Figures






Figure 3.2: Markov Chain of Probability – Switching - Size of Majority
R D
(Rleg −Dleg) ∗ δ
(Dleg −Rleg) ∗ ρ
1− (Dleg − Rleg) ∗ ρ




Appendix A Ensuring Compliance - Facts, Tables,
and Figures
A.1 Insurance Overview
This section provides a brief overview of the types of insurance, as is pertinent to
facilitate a discussion of the economic ideas presented in this paper among a general
audience.
A.1.1 Insurance Functions
Automobile insurance, like any insurance, is used to protect against loss by pooling
risk among a large group. This paper focuses on “uninsured motorists” or “uninsured
drivers” because it is the driver who bears the penalty if charged with driving unin-
sured. However, automobile insurance does not apply specifically to one driver, but
rather to a vehicle. That is to say, I am insured to drive my car if I have purchased
at least the minimum limits of coverage for it, but this insurance does not apply if I
drive your vehicle.
Forty-nine states and Washington D.C. require minimum levels of liability coverages
to be purchased in order to qualify as “insured.” There are additional coverages that




All states, except New Hampshire, require motorists to purchase minimum limits of
liability coverages. These consist of bodily injury (BI) and property damage (PD)
coverage. Bodily injury liability insurance covers damage an insured driver causes
to other people, while property damage liability insurance covers damage an insured
driver causes to other people’s vehicles or property. These mandatory liability cover-
ages do not insure against bodily harm to the insured driver or damage to the insured
driver’s vehicle or property.
A.1.3 Optional Coverages
Additional coverage may be purchased in order to insure against damage to an insured
driver’s vehicle. Collision insurance provides coverage for repair or replacement of the
insured driver’s own vehicle in the event of an accident where the driver crashes into a
car or another object. Comprehensive insurance covers damage to the insured driver’s
car from events that are not accident related, such as fire, falling objects, hitting deer
or other animals, and natural disasters.
A.1.4 Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Coverages
Drivers have the option to purchase “uninsured motorist coverage” (UM) and “un-
derinsured motorist coverage” (UIM), which will cover damages to themselves and
their property that is caused by an uninsured (or underinsured) driver.19 When an
19An “underinsured driver” is a driver who has liability insurance, but has purchased a level of
coverage too low to cover all of the damages caused to others when an accident occurs. For this
paper, I focus exclusively on uninsured motorists for two reasons. First, underinsured motorists by
definition hold at least the minimum amount of liability insurance required by the state. As such,
they are not driving illegally in this sense. Second, the data do not contain information allowing for
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uninsured driver causes an accident with an insured driver, the insured driver’s UM
coverage will cover bodily injury and property damages up to the limits of the (in-
sured driver’s) policy. However, the insured driver faces the additional burden of
paying a deductible, as well as the possibility of damages incurred in excess of the
coverage limits.
A.1.5 Relation to This Paper
This paper is focused on whether someone meets the minimum limits of liability cov-
erage as set by the state in which the vehicle is registered. However, other coverages
do come into play when discussing other margins of adjustment by drivers who are
making the decision not only of whether or not to purchase insurance, but also how
much coverage to purchase.
A.2 Equations
Possible Outcomes in Cost of Driving Uninsured:

0, if No Accident & No V iolation
F ine, if V iolation & No Accident
Damages, if Damages < Wealth & Unreported
Damages+ Fine, if Damages < Wealth & V iolation
Wealth, if Damages ≥Wealth
an estimate which distinguishes underinsured drivers.
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A.3 Tables and Figures
A.3.1 Tables
Table A.1: Predicted Effect of Law on Uninsured Driving and Precaution (Fatalities)
Estimated Effect of

















a The expected effect on driver precaution of uninsured drivers who
stop driving depends on how dangerous these drivers were, in com-
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix B Sunsets - Additional Equations, Ta-
bles, and Figures
B.1 Equations
The Legislator proposing a bill attempts to maximize:
δLR
δT
= (1− α)qαRT−α + (−1)
λqD
T 2(1− δ) = 0 (10)


















Figure B.1: Sunsets in Tax Code
*Source: Gale and Orszag (2003).
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Figure B.3: Markov Chain of Probability – Switching - Size of Majority - General
R D
(Dleg −Rleg) ∗ ρ
(Rleg −Dleg) ∗ δ
1− (Rleg −Dleg) ∗ δ
1− (Dleg − Rleg) ∗ ρ
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